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Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection 
 
Gerald Lang 
 
In a hugely significant and much discussed series of writings, G. A. Cohen attacks 
John 5DZOV·V´justice as fairnessµ for permitting morally arbitrary inequalities. On 
&RKHQ·VYLHZWhese inequalities are at odds with the egalitarian ethos that ought, 
E\5DZOV·VRZQOLJKWV to govern the attitudes and actions of agents in a Rawlsian 
society.1 
One potential reply which Cohen canvasses on behalf of Rawlsians, and then 
proceeds to attack, LVWKH´Freedom Objectionµ2 The Freedom Objection has 
received some attention, but there is much more to say about it. In my view, the 
Freedom Objection constitutes an important line of the Rawlsian·V defence against 
&RKHQ·VFULWLFLVPV, and it remains underappreciated why and how &RKHQ·V
responses to it are unsatisfactory.3 
The article unfolds as follows. Section I deals with necessary points of 
exposition,VXSSO\VRPHEULHIEDFNJURXQGWR&RKHQ·VJHQHUDOFULWLTXH RI5DZOV·V
justice as fairness, and then I go on to outline the Freedom Objection, which comes 
in two versions. In section II,RXWOLQHDQGWKHQDVVHVV&RKHQ·VUHVSRQVHWRWKH
´)LUVW9HUVLRQµ of the Freedom Objection, which has received comparatively little 
examination thus far. Then, in section III, I outline and DVVHVV&RKHQ·VZD\RI
dealing with the ´Second Versionµ of the Freedom Objection. A notable 
inconsistency EHWZHHQ&RKHQ·VWUHDWPHQWRIWKH)LUVW9HUVLRQDQGKLVWUHDWPHQWRI
the Second Version is also identified in section III. The discussion concludes, in 
section IV, with a further suggestion of why Cohen may find it more difficult than 
he thinks to escape commitment to the legal enforcement of occupational choice.  
 
I. Justice as Fairness and the Freedom Objection 
To begin with some basic background: 5DZOV·V difference principle, which is part of 
his second principle of justice, permits certain inequalities that work to improve the 
prospects of the least well-off. Inequalities which do not improve the prospects of 
the least well-off are not permitted. A special justification for the inequalities 
authorized by the difference principle has to be secured because, as Nozick put it, 
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DQHTXDOGLVWULEXWLRQRIVRFLDOSULPDU\JRRGVFDQEHOHJLWLPDWHO\UHJDUGHGDV´WKH
UHVW«SRVLWLRQRI>5DZOV·V@V\VWHPGHYLDWion from which may be caused only by 
PRUDOIRUFHVµ4 So what creates the egalitarian default, and what are the moral 
forces that can justify deviation from it? 
7KHHJDOLWDULDQGHIDXOWLVSULQFLSDOO\FUHDWHGE\5DZOV·VKRVWLOLW\WRPRUDOO\
arbitrary sources of inequalities, such as the natural and social endowments for 
which we can take no credit. On Cohen·VUHDGLQJRIRawls, morally arbitrary facts 
should not, as a deep matter of justice, enjoy any influence on the selection of 
principles of justice. Such influence would be problematic, from the standpoint of 
justice, even if the resulting inequalities made the worst-off better off than they 
would otherwise be. Nonetheless, the fact that these inequalities do make the 
unavoidably worst-off better off than they would otherwise be may give us a strong 
independent moral reason to approve of them. Cohen calls this further source of 
support for incentives WKH´3DUHWR$UJXPHQWµ for inequality.5  
To illustrate in greater detail the central point of the Pareto Argument, let us 
imagine that the preliminary, anti-arbitrariness considerations prompt Rawlsian 
agents to select a distribution, D1, which is free of morally arbitrary inequalities. 
Imagine now that D1 is Pareto-inferior to an achievable unequal Pareto-superior 
distribution, D2: compared to D1, D2 is better for everyone, and worse for no one, 
though it does introduce morally arbitrary inequalities which were absent in D1. 
Having steered themselves to D1, these agents will consider it irrational to stay 
there, if they can opt for D2 instead. The difference principle, which permits D2, is 
therefore the joint product of two separate sets of considerations, which jointly 
commend an initially equal distribution (i.e. D1), but then embrace, in preference 
to D1, an unequal distribution (i.e. D2) if D2 is better for everyone or at least some 
people (the worst-off in particular), and worse for no one. 
Cohen does not object as such to the fact that the terminus of this journey is 
D2, rather than D1. Nonetheless, he advances two significant objections against 
the Pareto Argument. 
First, the part of the journey that takes us from D1 to D2 cannot be 
endorsed by the value of justice in particular. This is because the considerations 
which favour egalitarianism, and thus the initial selection of D1, stand in tension 
with the considerations fuelling the Pareto Argument, and thus which favour the 
selection of D2 over D1. Replacing D1 with D2, even if D2 makes everyone better off 
and no one worse off, will simply re-introduce the morally arbitrary inequalities 
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which the earlier selection of D1 had managed to avoid. Accordingly, D2 will have a 
specific justice-centred defect that D1 lacked, even if D2 is more choiceworthy, all 
things considered. 
Second, the Pareto Argument overlooks other possibilities for improving the 
position of the worst-off, which places the argument in a more flattering light than 
it really deserves. 5DZOVLDQDJHQWVDUHQRWIDFHGZLWKDEUXWH´PDQQDIURPKHDYHQµ
choice between D1 and D2. They are not forced, as of necessity, to choose between 
the equality enshrined by D1 and the Pareto-optimality enshrined by D2. The high-
flying talented agents are, after all, effectively choosing to withhold the labour or 
services that would improve the prospects of the least advantaged in the absence of 
higher payment. For typical values of D1 and D2, where D2 is Pareto-superior to 
D1, high-flying conscientious Rawlsians could opt to produce a third distribution, 
D3, which is Pareto-superior to D1 but Pareto-incomparable with D2 (since the 
better-off in D3 will not be as well off as the better-off are in D2). In D3, the worst-
off are as well off as they are in D2, but there are no more morally arbitrary 
inequalities contained in D3 than there were in D1. This demonstrates, for Cohen, 
that Pareto-optimality is not, in fact, incompatible with equality, and it raises the 
question of why conscientious justice-seeking individuals should not seek to 
benefit the worse-off in ways which also avoid placing them at the losing end of 
morally arbitrary inequalities. 
Having amassed this background, we are now in a position to turn to the 
Freedom Objection, which comes in two versions: a more general version, 
concerned with the underl\LQJVSLULWRI5DZOV·VSRVLWLRQ and a more specifically 
Rawlsian YHUVLRQFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHOHWWHURI5DZOV·VSRVLWLRQ6 I will refer to these 
versions of the Freedom Objection as the First Version and Second Version, 
respectively. 
 The First Version of the Freedom Objection appeals to a ´WULOHPPDFODLPµ or 
´trilemma problemµ which aims to demonstrate that the following principles 
cannot be co-satisfied: 
 
1. A distribution which avoids morally arbitrary inequalities. [Equality] 
2. A distribution which is Pareto-optimal, or which would be better for some, 
and worse for no one.7 [Pareto] 
3. A distribution which upholds freedom of occupational choice.8 [Freedom] 
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To illustrate the trilemma problem, consider 6DUDK·V personal job-and-
income preferences, which, RQ&RKHQ·VVWLSXODWLRQFRQIRUP to the following 
preference ordering, from the most-preferred (a) to the least-preferred (c): 
 
(a) Working as a doctor for £50,000 per annum. 
(b) Working as a gardener for £20,000 per annum. 
(c) Working as a doctor for £20,000 per annum.9 
 
If the same salary is appended to doctoring and gardening, Sarah prefers 
gardening, but she can be coaxed into doctoring for the higher salary of £50,000 
per annum, which will compensate her for the sacrifice she makes in doctoring 
rather than gardening during her working hours. It is assumed here that £20,000 
per annum is the egalitarian salary.10 It is also assumed that none of these options 
imposes notable welfare losses on Sarah: although she definitely prefers gardening 
to doctoring, doctoring will not constitute a life of drudgery.11 
6DUDK·VSUHIHUHQFHRUGHULQJHDVLO\LOlustrates why the trilemma presents 
Cohen with a challenge. To realize the value of Equality, Sarah will have to choose 
either (b) or (c). The choice of (a) will introduce a morally arbitrary inequality, since 
6DUDK·VDZDUGRIIRUGRFWRULQJZLOOUHflect her possession of talent which is, 
at bottom, morally arbitrary. To realize the value of Pareto, Sarah will have to 
choose (a) or (c). Choosing either (b) or (c) will preserve the egalitarian distribution, 
EXWLWLVDVVXPHGLQ&RKHQ·VH[DPSOHWKDWWKHVRFLDOYDOXHRI6DUDK·VGRFWRULQJ
activity far exceeds the social value of her gardening activity. Even if Sarah has to 
be paid £50,000 rather than £20,000 per annum to coax her into working as a 
doctor, the community as a whole will still be better off if Sarah spends her working 
life doctoring than if she spends it gardening. 
So far, satisfaction of Equality and satisfaction of Pareto are not disjoint: (c) 
satisfies both of them. This reply would complete what Cohen has to say about the 
Pareto Argument, in particular. Cohen can handle the disputed coexistence of 
Pareto and Equality by reminding conscientious Rawlsian agents that it lies within 
their power to realize a distribution that secures the coexistence of Pareto and 
Equality. But now he has a new variable to worry about. This is because, if the 
value of Freedom is going to be realized, Sarah will choose (a), not (c). In fact, and 
E\DVVXPSWLRQFOLHVDWWKHERWWRPRI6DUDK·VSUHIHUHQFHUDQNLQJ6DUDKSUHIHUV
(a) to (b), and (b) to (c). So, in this particular case, Equality, Pareto, and Freedom 
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cannot all co-obtain. In this sense, then, the additional value at stake in the 
Freedom Objection³the value of freedom of occupational choice³threatens to 
renew the challenge posed originally by the Pareto Argument, because it appears 
not to be amenable to &RKHQ·Voriginal proposal for solving the tension between 
Equality and Pareto.  
Now we turn to the Second Version of the Freedom Objection, which is more 
concerned with the detailed construction of justice as fairness. The Second Version 
claims that Rawlsian agents who take advantage of inequality-generating incentives 
are simply exercising their freedom of occupational choice, which is bequeathed to 
them by a suitably capacious understanding of the first principle of justice, 
concerning the distribution of basic liberties WKH´OLEHUW\SULQFLSOH,µIRUVKRUW. The 
first principle of justice, moreover, is lexically prior to the second principle of 
justice. Now Cohen reminds us that Rawls tends not to include freedom of 
occupational choice in canonical statements of the basic liberties encompassed by 
the first principle of justice.12 But Rawls does speak approvingly, here and there, 
about freedom of occupational choice, such as to suggest that he regards it as a 
significant freedom.13 In any case, it does not strain credulity to insist that 
provision for freedom of occupational choice belongs to a charitable reading of the 
first principle, and Cohen does not put his foot down over this interpretation of 
what Rawls had in mind. 
7KLVLV&RKHQ·VIXOOHUYHUVLRQRIWKH6HFRQG9HUVLRQ, using the values of D1 
and D3 as they have already been defined:14 
 
1. The liberty principle is lexically prior to the difference principle. 
2. The liberty principle mandates freedom of choice of occupation. 
3. The move from D1 to D3 denies freedom of choice of occupation. 
4. 7KHPRYHWR'FDQQRWEHMXVWLILHGRQWKHEDVLVRI5DZOV·VGLIIHUHQFH
principle. 
   
The Second Version carries particular significance because, if Rawlsian 
agents are simply taking DGYDQWDJHRIDIUHHGRPZKLFK5DZOV·VRZQWKHRUy 
explicitly provides for, they cannot be reasonably taken to task for betraying that 
theory by then actually taking advantage of that freedom. They cannot bear the 
ZURQJUHODWLRQWR5DZOV·VWKHRU\LIWKHWKHRry explicitly permits them, as one of its 
constituent parts, to bear that very relation to it. Perhaps they have signed up to 
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the wrong theory, but they do not betray that theory, and the charge of betrayal, or 
internal incompatibility between avowed principle and enacted choice, plays a 
central role in &RKHQ·VDUJXPHQWDJDLQVWRawls. Cohen tends to argue that Rawls is 
letting himself down, or, at best, that he is guilty of a puzzling oversight; the 
problem is that Rawls has given the difference principle a remit which betrays the 
deep anti-arbitrariness considerations that provide his theory of justice with its 
ultimate source of moral direction and purpose. If the Second Version is defensible, 
however, Rawlsians can withstand this charge.  
 
II. 7KH´(WKLFDO6ROXWLRQµWRWKH)UHHGRP2EMHFWLRQ 
Let us deal, first of all, with Cohen·VDUJXPHQWDJDLQVWWKH)LUVW9HUVLRQRIWKH
Freedom Objection, in which the trilemma looms large. He attempts to dissolve the 
trilemma argument by presentiQJLWZLWKDQ´ethical solutionµ15 On this 
(deceptively simple-looking) solution, Sarah chooses to doctor for £20,000 per 
annum16 out of moral inspiration. Moreover³and this is the crucial point³morally 
inspired action is not unfree action. If Sarah chooses to doctor for £20,000 because 
she thinks she morally ought to, then each of the claims in the trilemma will be 
satisfied. Her choice will achieve three things: first, the resulting distribution will 
satisfy Equality; second, it will be Pareto-superior to the equal distribution that 
would result if Sarah were to choose to garden for £20,000, thus satisfying Pareto; 
and third, it will uphold Freedom, since the outcome conforms to her own free, 
morally inspired, choice. 
The central point behind the ethical solution is that morally inspired choices 
do not abridge freedom. Since that is so, and since the content of the morally 
inspired choices made by conscientious agents can, as before, resolve the tension 
between Equality and Pareto, there is no problem. To solve the Freedom Objection, 
all that needs to be added to &RKHQ·V original solution to the Pareto Argument is 
moral inspiration. 
But can that really be true? Morality does limit our options for self-
interested action, after all, and it is reasonable to suspect that those constraints do 
reduce our freedom, even if we voluntarily comply with them. Call this the 
Restriction Worry. If the Restriction Worry can be upheld, the Freedom Objection 
will be vindicated. 
Cohen attempts to rebut what I have called the Restriction Worry on two 
separate fronts. The first of them is concerned with the connection between 
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freedom and objectively true moral principles. I will call this the objective 
interpretation. The second of them is concerned with the connection between 
freedom and our moral beliefs. This is the subjective interpretation. These 
interpretations are separate because, while our beliefs aim at truth, these beliefs 
may of course be false. The distinction between subjective and objective 
interpretations is explicitly noted by Cohen, who, leaning on what he describes as 
WKH´poO\LQWHUSUHWDELOLW\RIWKHWHUP´FRQVWUDLQµµ draws the distinction between 
constraints imposed by ´PRUDOLW\DVVXFKµ DQGE\´RQH·VRZQPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWµ17 
The constraints imposHGE\´PRUDOLW\DVVXFKµPDWFKWKHREMHFWLYHLQterpretation, 
ZKLOHWKHFRQVWUDLQWVLPSRVHGE\´RQH·VRZQPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWµGHOLYHUWKH
subjective interpretation. Whichever of these interpretations we focus on, however, 
Cohen contends that the Restriction Worry is misplaced.18 I will examine his 
treatment of the two interpretations in turn. I think there is something 
unsatisfactory about his treatment of each of them. 
Consider, first, the objective interpretation. As we know, Cohen argues that 
justice, as Rawls conceives it at a deep level, requires the elimination of morally 
arbitrary relative disadvantage. Cohen refers to this principle, in these particular 
passages, as WKH´no-inequality restrictionµ Morality generates many other 
principles and restrictions as well. One such highly plausible principle, which 
Cohen selects at random to illustrate his argument, is the prohibition on homicide, 
RUWKH´QR-KRPLFLGHPRUDOUHVWULFWLRQµ Cohen compares them in the following 
passage, in which the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry is presented 
with a dilemma: 
 
Either the moral prohibition on murder counts as constraining or it does 
not. If it does, then it is false that we do not want a morality whose edicts are 
constraining. But if the no-homicide moral restriction does not constrain, 
then why should the no-inequality moral restriction be thought to 
constrain?19 
 
Cohen thinks that it would be question-begging to assume that the no-
inequality restricWLRQLVIDOVHWRGRVRLV´inadmissibleµ20 But if that is so, then the 
no-inequality restriction is in privileged company: its fortunes will track those of 
the no-homicide restriction. The objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry 
cannot hope to displace the no-inequality restriction any more than it could hope to 
displace the no-homicide restriction. But what if, after all, the no-inequality 
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restriction is false? Then there is, in effect, nothing to discuss. The objective 
interpretation will not be in play if the no-inequality restriction does not qualify as 
an objective moral principle. 
In short, then, Cohen is presenting the proponent of the objective 
interpretation of the Restriction Worry with a dilemma. Either it is too late for the 
no-inequality restriction to be challenged by the Restriction Worry, simply in virtue 
of its being a prescription of objective morality. This is the first horn. Or it is too 
early to invoke the Restriction Worry, simply in virtue of the fact that the no-
inequality restriction does not even qualify as a prescription of objective morality. 
That is the second horn. Either way, there will be nothing for Cohen to worry about 
under this particular heading.21 The concern effaces itself, and now, it would seem, 
the fate of the Restriction Worry must stand or fall on the subjective interpretation. 
:KDWVKRXOGZHPDNHRI&RKHQ·s treatment of the objective interpretation of 
the Restriction Worry? Cohen is correct to this extent: if the no-inequality 
restriction can be deemed to be morally unimpeachable, then it will be as secure as 
the no-homicide restriction. It will indeed be too late to challenge the no-inequality 
restriction by appealing to freedom of occupational choice. So the first horn seems 
secure. But &RKHQ·VDUJXPHQWLVVWLOOdialectically unsatisfactory. For what is, or 
ought to be, under consideration at this point in the argument is the no-inequality 
UHVWULFWLRQ·Vclaim to be an objective prescription of morality. Can the no-inequality 
UHVWULFWLRQ·VFODLPWRunimpeachability still be challenged by its incursions into 
personal freedom? 
Cohen says that it would beg the question against him to assume that the 
no-inequality restriction is false. And so it would. But this is not what is going on 
in the Rawlsian argument. The no-inequality restriction is not being assumed in 
advance to be false. Nor is it question-begging to allow the stringency of the no-
inequality restriction to be called into question by the claim that it intrudes into 
personal freedom. The objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry challenges 
&RKHQ·V position by suggesting that strict compliance with the no-inequality 
restriction curtails a valuable freedom³freedom of occupational choice³which will, 
in turn, render it impossible to co-achieve the three principles of the trilemma. 
Since we know that Rawls places value on freedom of occupational choice, as a 
privileged route to DQLQGLYLGXDO·Vself-realization and self-expression, we have the 
makings of a perfectly intelligible explanation of why Rawls does not insist that 
individuals·SHUVRQDOFKRLFHV conform to the no-inequality restriction, and why any 
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understanding to the contrary would actually imperil their self-realization. If 
LQGLYLGXDOV· choices did conform to the no-inequality restriction, they would be 
curtailing³albeit voluntarily³this particular area of personal sovereignty which 
5DZOV·VWKeory awards to them. Since, according to the Freedom Objection, we have 
very good reasons to provide for this area of personal sovereignty, we have all the 
material we need for explaining why, in justice as fairness, the no-inequality 
restriction is not strict, and holds only when freedom of occupational choice has 
already been provided for. 5DZOV·VWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHLQVKRUWLVFRPSOH[LW
combines provision for the basic liberties with provision for rough distributive 
equality of the social primary goods.22 If this is not the challenge posed by the 
objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry, then what is the challenge 
supposed to amount to? 
It is, in fact, Cohen who arguably begs the question about the objective 
interpretation by appearing to assume that freedom of occupational choice does not 
stand in tension with the no-inequality restriction. To illustrate these question-
begging tendencies, imagine that we are testing the credentials of an avowedly 
implausible moral principle, whose content can be glossed as the no-premarital-sex 
principle. The major feature of the no-premarital-sex principle I want to emphasize 
here, aside from its implausibility, lies in the source of its implausibility. Let us 
agree that the no-premarital-sex principle is implausible, at least in part, because it 
denies unmarried adult men and women the opportunities, conditional upon the 
consent of others, to conduct their sexual lives as they see fit.23 That is, the no-
premarital-sex principle will infringe upon our personal freedom. Now assume, as 
before, that the Restriction Worry is articulated as a challenge to the no-premarital-
sex restriction. Defenders of the no-premarital-sex restriction³I am not, of course, 
counting Cohen as one of them³might then distinguish, as before, between the 
objective interpretation and the subjective interpretation of the Restriction Worry. 
And, to defend the no-premarital-sex principle against the objective interpretation 
of the Restriction Worry, they might elect to advance the following argument, which 
precisely mirrors &RKHQ·VGHIHQFHRIWKHQR-inequality moral restriction:  
 
Either the moral prohibition on murder counts as constraining or it does 
not. If it does, then it is false that we do not want a morality whose edicts are 
constraining. But if the no-homicide moral restriction does not constrain, 
then why should the no-premarital-sex moral restriction be thought to 
constrain? 
10 
 
 
 
As before, a dilemma for the objective interpretation of the Restriction Worry 
opens up for critics of the no-premarital-sex restriction. On the first horn of it, it 
will be too late for those critics to raise the Restriction Worry if the no-premarital-
sex restriction is already a prescription of objective morality. We should not allow 
questions to be begged in advance against the no-premarital-sex restriction. On the 
second horn of it, it will be too early to invoke the Restriction Worry if the no-
premarital-sex restriction does not qualify as a prescription of the Restriction 
Worry. Once again, the fate of the no-premarital-sex restriction will now turn on 
what we can say about the subjective interpretation of the Restriction Worry. (And 
we can see what is coming up when we arrive there: what if individuals morally 
believe they should not have sex before marriage? Are they then free? So there can 
be no problem!) 
This iVDQXQVDWLVIDFWRU\GHYHORSPHQWDQGGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW&RKHQ·V
argument over-generates implications. For what if we want to reject the no-
premarital-sex restriction³as I am assuming we do³because it is insufficiently 
respectful of personal freedom? There seems to be no room withiQ&RKHQ·V
dialectical framework to register this concern. It clearly would not do to uphold the 
no-premarital-sex restriction by comparing it with the no-homicide restriction, if 
our opposition to the no-premarital-sex restriction is driven precisely by its 
disrespect for the freedom of single people to have consensual sex. This argument 
illegitimately assumes that the no-premarital-sex restriction already collects the 
high moral pedigree collected by the no-homicide restriction. The no-premarital-sex 
restriction could enjoy such a high moral pedigree in such an argument only if its 
defenders assumed that the freedom-based challenge to it lacked any decisive 
force. But there could be no justification for making such an assumption before the 
freedom-based argument for the falsity of the no-premarital-sex restriction had 
even been heard. 
In the relevant dialectical sense, the no-inequality restriction operates like 
the no-premarital-sex restriction. Rawlsians who advance the Freedom Objection 
appeal to the value of freedom of occupational choice precisely WRGLVDUP&RKHQ·V
opposition to Rawlsian incentives.24 It is because Rawls is committed to freedom of 
occupational choice and other sorts of freedom that he does not insist that 
individuals be guided by the no-inequality restriction all the way down,25 to 
encompass everyday decision-making and occupational choices. It is striking that 
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this argument goes unconsidered by Cohen. &RKHQ·VDUJXment, in fact, prevents 
the Rawlsian argument from even getting off the ground, so his treatment must be 
deemed unsatisfactory. 
 Turn now to the relationship between the Restriction Worry and the 
subjective interpretation of freedom. Cohen remarks: 
 
[W]e should not normally think that whoever acts under moral inspiration 
acts unfreely. Why, then, should we think that someone acts unfreely if his 
occupational choice reflects a sense of social obligation?26 
 
And again: 
 
If we stipulate that a person acts freely when and only when he does what he 
would most like to do, prescinding from his generosity and in disregard of 
the norms he endorses, then the trilemma problem is insoluble, but also 
uninteresting.27 
 
&RKHQ·VYLHZ, as it emerges from these passages, is fairly clear: when we act, we act 
for various reasons, and those reasons at least typically reflect what values we 
think apply to the situation we are in. It is myopic to think that these values 
encroach upon our freedom. Properly understood, they provide structure, not 
constraint; our values shape our view of the situation we are in, so that our 
responses to it can be rendered intelligible. 
 As far as it goes, this claim seems reasonable. The values we believe in, and 
which shape our actions, are not necessarily antithetical to freedom. Nonetheless, 
it is difficult to see how the subjective interpretation of the Restriction Worry, in 
and by itself, can make much of a difference to the fate of the Freedom Objection. 
The original point of distinguishing it from the objective interpretation, after all, 
was that our beliefs can fail to be aligned with the truth of the principles which 
they aim to track. If an agent endorses norms which are simply indefensible, then it 
cannot be much of a recommendation of a theory that it makes provision for the 
DJHQW·Vunobstructed pursuit of those mistaken norms. (It may not count strongly 
against the theory, but it will not count strongly in favour of it, either.) Of course, 
DQDJHQW·V´JHQHURVLW\µLVXQOLNHO\WREHDQRUP we find ourselves questioning. The 
same goes for the norm of justice, suitably broadly construed. But it is not 
generosity or the broad concept of justice, but a much more fine-grained theory of 
justice, which is supposed to be drLYLQJ&RKHQ·VSLFWXUHKHUHDQG we already know 
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that &RKHQ·VWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHLVRSSRVHGWR5DZOV·VWKHRU\ of justice, at least as 
Rawls conceives it.  
 To make stark the limited contribution made by the subjective 
interpretation, imagine an extreme case in which Chloe has been held captive and 
has developed a version of Stockholm syndrome. Chloe now endorses norms whose 
upshot is that her kidnappers ought to continue to hold her captive. Given her 
moral beliefs, Chloe suffers no restriction to her freedom, as it is subjectively 
experienced. She willingly conforms to the conditions of her captivity. But none of 
this demonstrates that she enjoys freedom. Clearly, she does not. Naturally, this 
example is not meant to VKRZWKDWDQDJHQWZKRVKDUHV&RKHQ·VEHOLHIVDERut 
occupational choice is on a par with an agent whose moral beliefs are shaped by 
Stockholm syndrome. (That would be demonstrably unfair.) All the example is 
meant to do is to demonstrate, in a deliberately stark form, that subjective beliefs 
without a prior objective grounding to accompany them do not get us far enough. 
Even if there are individuals who would voluntarily LPSOHPHQW&RKHQ·V
thoroughgoing egalitarianism in their occupational choices, we do not yet have an 
argument why Rawlsians are wrong to think that these agents are losing out on an 
important freedom which is provided by Rawlsian justice as fairness. And that 
PXVWEH&RKHQ·VDPELWLRQLQKLVGHDOLQJVZLWK the Freedom Objection: to 
demonstrate that Rawlsians lose this argument. It is vital to remember that the 
Freedom Objection, at the end of the day, is a defensive argument: Rawlsians use it 
to defend justice as fairness DJDLQVW&RKHQ·VFRPSODLQWVDERXWit. If Cohen is going 
to defeat the Freedom Objection, it is incumbent on him to show that this Rawlsian 
defence is inadequate. The bare insistence WKDWDQDJHQW·VSHUVRQDOPRUDO
commitments are sufficient to preserve her freedom cannot achieve this end, 
because these commitments need to be related to the adequacy of the moral 
principles which they reflect. That takes us back, in turn, to the objective 
interpretation of the Restriction Worry. And, as we have seen, Cohen does not 
permit an honest engagement with the objective interpretation. His argument is 
rigged in such a way that the objective interpretation does not receive proper 
discussion. But that leaves him with a problem. Without an explicit interrogation of 
the objective interpretation, and given the relative toothlessness of the subjective 
interpretation, Cohen simply cannot achieve what he set out to do. 
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 The subjective interpretation RI&RKHQ·VUHSO\WRWKH5HVWULFWLRQ:RUU\ is 
disqualified, then, from playing a significant role in his treatment of the Freedom 
Objection. This is doubly unfortunate for Cohen. Why? 
First, his argument is clearly dependent on the subjective interpretation, not 
just the objective interpretation. To recapitulate, Cohen·VYLHZLVWKDW the trilemma 
problem is solved if Sarah freely chooses to doctor for £20,000; the solution 
consists in WKHSRLQWWKDW6DUDK·VFKRLFHs reflect her moral beliefs, together with the 
point that choices which reflect DQDJHQW·V moral beliefs are still free. This solution 
turns squarely on an appeal to the subjective interpretation, not the objective 
interpretation. ,WLVGHSHQGHQWRQ6DUDK·Vactual moral beliefs and the actual 
choices she makes in light of those beliefs. 
The second source of misfortune for Cohen is that his solution stands in a 
puzzling tension with the line he takes with the Second Version of the Freedom 
Objection. I return to this matter in the next section, when the Second Version is 
under discussion. 
For the sake of completeness, and because the first two interpretations have 
now come under heavy attack, we should consider a third and distinct possibility, 
which Cohen does not explicitly consider, but which, conceivably, he may have had 
in mind. This interpretation combines elements of the objective interpretation and 
the subjective interpretation. Its possibility arises out of &RKHQ·VIRQGQHVVIRUWKH
SKUDVH´PRUDOO\LQVSLUHGµ, which might, after all, admit of a factive interpretation. 
Call this third interpretation the hybrid interpretation. On the hybrid interpretation, 
IUHHGRPLVSUHVHUYHGZKHQWKUHHFRQGLWLRQVDUHVDWLVILHGILUVWWKHDJHQW·VDFWLRQV
are explained by her moral beliefs; seconGWKHDJHQW·VEHOLHIVDUHWUXH, or 
maximally adequate;28 and third, her morally inspired actions are not obstructed. If 
we adopt the hybrid interpretation, we will not have to worry about the frustration 
of subjective moral freedom in cases where agents clearly hold false moral beliefs, 
such as the Stockholm syndrome case. 
Though initially promising, the appeal to the hybrid interpretation carries 
two dangers. First, it still collects all the criticisms which originally accrued to 
&RKHQ·V treatment of the objective interpretation. It remains the case that RaZOV·V
account has not been granted a fair hearing. Second, and in any case, the hybrid 
interpretation risks being ad hoc. If there is a separate story to acknowledge about 
the Restriction Worry and DQDJHQW·VVXEMHFWLYHVWDQFHWRWKHPRUDOSULQFLSOHVVKH
HVSRXVHVLWLVQRWREYLRXVZK\WKHDJHQW·VEHOLHIVKDYHWREHtrue. What will matter, 
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once again, is that she possesses those beliefs, and that she is acting on them. Now 
I have argued that there is no such separate story to acknowledge when we look at 
the subjective interpretation alone, independently of how the objective 
interpretation fares. As a result, however, I believe that we can be relatively 
dismissive of the hybrid interpretation, as well as the subjective interpretation. 
 
III. Why Not Stalinism? 
We turn now WR&RKHQ·VZD\RIKDQGOLQJWKH6HFRQG9HUVLRQRIWKH)UHHGRP
2EMHFWLRQ&RKHQ·VPDLQEXVLQHVVKHUHLVWRSUHVVKDUGRQWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
the legal right of occupational freedom and the moral right of occupational freedom. 
2Q&RKHQ·VYLHZWhe liberty principle which leads the charge in the Second Version 
should now be understood as the legal right of occupational freedom, rather than 
the moral right of occupational freedom. 
Like Rawls, Cohen has no interest in denying the legal right of occupational 
freedom. +HLVRSSRVHGWRWKH´[o]ld-style Stalinistically inFOLQHGµ29 variant of 
egalitarianism which would simply bite the bullet and coerce individuals into 
socially useful occupations. Against this Stalinist ´IRUFLQJµRU´frogmarchingµ30 he 
appeals, once again, to the egalitarian ethos which should motivate conscientious 
Rawlsian agents to forego job-and-income packages which would introduce morally 
arbitrary inequalities. As he puts it: ´I reject both Stalinist force and Rawlsian 
inducement, in favour of an ethos of justiceµ31  
 Cohen does not deny, then, that morality has a say on the exercises in 
occupational choice made by agents. The value of justice will direct them towards 
certain ocFXSDWLRQDOFKRLFHVDQGQRWRWKHUV%XWPRUDOLW\·VWUDFWLRQLQWKLVDUHD
does not mandate coercion, and the absence of coercive policies is, in fact, 
sufficient to uphold the relevant freedom. At bottom, &RKHQ·VEDVLFUHSO\WRWKH
Stalinist Worry, as we can call it, about the coercive enforcement of occupational 
choice is fairly simple. The Stalinist enforcement of occupational choice is not a 
necessary part of the egalitarian picture; so, if it is Stalinist policies we dread, then 
we should simply eschew Stalinist policies. We should not legally enforce 
occupational choice. We should leave individuals legally free to select, or to decline 
to select, the occupational choices which justice may demand of them. 
7RIXUWKHUWHVW&RKHQ·VSRVLWLRQZHQHHGWRSD\DWtention to two important 
passages which contribute to his argument. I will label them ´PassaJH$µDQG
´3DVVDJH%µ: 
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Passage A: 
The value of freedom lies in the absence of coercion itself, not in the absence 
of legitimate moral demands that, being legitimate, cannot be absent.32 
 
Passage B: 
It is of the nature of liberty that it leaves choices open, and, therefore, it is of 
the nature of the liberty principle that it should apply to the structure of 
choice alone and be indifferent to the content of choice. It is not of the 
nature of distributive justice that it should be silent on the content of choice 
within the right structure.33  
 
As I hope to show, WKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJDZU\DERXW&RKHQ·VDQWL-Stalinist argument. 
 First, consider CRKHQ·VFODLPLQ3DVVDJH$WKDW´[t]he value of freedom lies in 
WKHDEVHQFHRIFRHUFLRQLWVHOIµ But that cannot be because coercion is 
straightforwardly antithetical to freedom. Even if Sarah is coerced into doctoring at 
£20,000&RKHQ·VYLHZwhich is clearly stated in his other work and is plausible in 
its own right, is that Sarah is also free to doctor for that salary.34 If freedom is a 
matter of having an unobstructed opportunity to do something,35 then coercion, far 
from dismantling that freedom, actually ensures its existence. If Sarah has no 
choice other than to doctor for £20,000, then she is free to doctor for £20,000. The 
lack of opportunity to do otherwise does not mean that she lacks the freedom to do 
what she is being made to do. What is removed, if Sarah is coerced into doctoring 
for £20,000, is her freedom not to doctor for £20,000. It is when, and only when, 
Sarah has both the freedom to work as a doctor for £20,000 and the freedom to 
decline to doctor for £20,000 that she can be properly regarded as being able to 
work as a doctor for £20,000 freely6LQFH6DUDK·VIUHHGRPWRZRUNDVDGRFWRU for 
£20,000 is entirely compatible with Stalinist forcing, it must therefore be the 
combination RI6DUDK·VIUHHGRPWRZRUNDVDGoctor for £20,000 together with her 
freedom not to work as a doctor for £20,000 which is of central importance to 
&RKHQ·VDWWHPSW to disarm the Stalinist Worry. 
Further support for this interpretation is offered by CoheQ·VUHPDUNLQ
3DVVDJH%WKDW´it is of the nature of the liberty principle that it should apply to the 
structure of choice alone and be indiffHUHQWWRWKHFRQWHQWRIFKRLFHµ &RKHQ·V
UHIHUHQFHWRWKH´VWUXFWXUHRIFKRLFHµFRQILUPVWKDWKHLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKH
H[LVWHQFHRIDOWHUQDWHRSWLRQVLQ6DUDK·VRSSRUWXQLW\VHW6DUDKPXVWKDYHWKH
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ability to decline to doctor for £20,000 if her freedom to doctor for £20,000 is to be 
considered valuable. 
Passage B also teaches us something else, which is that his treatment of the 
Stalinist Worry is standing in WHQVLRQZLWKWKH´HWKLFDOVROXWLRQµKHSrovides to the 
trilemma problem. What matters in his reply to the Stalinist Worry is not the 
freedom which is preserved in and through 6DUDK·VPRUDOO\VKDSHGFKRLFHVEXWthe 
existence of an opportunity set: Sarah must enjoy the opportunity among different 
options to be guided by, or decline to be guided by, her moral convictions, whatever 
they are. It follows that &RKHQ·VZD\RIGHDOLQJZLWKWKH6WDOLQLVW:RUU\DULVLQJ
from the Second Version of the Freedom Objection, appears inconsistent with his 
way of dealing with the First Version of the Freedom Objection.36 The reply to the 
)LUVW9HUVLRQUHTXLUHVRQO\WKDW6DUDK·VIUHHGRPLVSUHVHUYHGLIVKHGRFWRUVIRU
£20,000 out of moral conviction, whereas the reply to the Second Version requires 
WKDW6DUDK·VIUHHGRPLVSUeserved only if she has the freedom not to doctor for 
£20,000. 
Can this tension be assuaged? Cohenians might concede that the solution to 
the Stalinist Worry (which requires the existence of an opportunity set) is 
considerably more demanding than the solution to the trilemma argument (which 
requires the existence only of morally inspired choices), but insist that there is no 
outright inconsistency between these solutions. After all, morally inspired choices 
can still unfold within a framework of alternate options. This point is true, as far as 
it goes, but we have already seen that Cohen places a heavy emphasis, in his 
discussion of the trilemma problem, on the claim that nothing other than the 
possibility of morally inspired choice is required to make that problem go away, 
because nothing other than morally inspired choice is required to uphold freedom. 
So if Cohen contends that we actually need more than moral inspiration to uphold 
the value of freedom, his argument against the First Version of the Freedom 
Objection will have been exposed, by his own lights, as inadequate. We are still left 
with a puzzle.37 
&RKHQ·V antidote to the Stalinist Worry also generates another important 
question: what does the value of acting freely consist in? One possible answer to 
this question, suggested by Passage A, is that acting freely avoids the disvalue of 
coercion. But that is actually a poor answer, at least without supplementation. The 
disvalue of coercion must have something to do with the value of what coercion 
removes: namely, the value of acting freely. But we will be trapped in a justificatory 
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circle if the value of acting freely has to be explained in terms of the absence of the 
disvalue of coercion, and if the disvalue of coercion then has to be explained in 
terms of the presence of the value of acting freely. We need more from Cohen than 
just the bare refusal to entertain the idea of coercion. 
&RPSDUH5DZOVLDQV·UHVSRQVHWRWKHVDPHTXHVWLRQIRUWKHPLWLVWKHYDOXH
of acting freely, construed as a vehicle of individual self-realization, which allows 
them to break out of this justificatory circle. ,IWKHUHLVFRHUFLRQRILQGLYLGXDOV·
occupational choices, then these individuals will be deprived of the freedom to seek 
self-realization by choosing which occupations they join, and this is the site on 
which Rawlsians will mount their opposition. But Cohen has already repudiated 
this Rawlsian strategy. He must therefore appeal to other considerations. 
Now Cohen does not, in fact, make a brute appeal to the disvalue of coercion 
in order to explain the value of acting freely, contrary to what Passage A seems to 
imply. But it is important to labour the truth that he is not entitled to make any 
such brute appeal to the disvalue of coercion, simply in order to clarify what work 
must now be discharged by the other considerations he offers. And the problem is 
that those considerations, when examined more closely, are not particularly 
convincing.38 
 Cohen makes four further points in connection with this issue.39 First, he 
thinks that coercive enforcement may be counterproductive: to avoid their exposure 
to Stalinist frogmarching, individuals may be motivated to conceal their talents and 
preferences. Second, and partly as a result, there will be informational deficits and 
distortions that arise, which will make Stalinist central planning crude and highly 
inefficient. Third, Stalinist enforcement will make it difficult for individuals to act 
from a sense of justice, since this specifically moral motivation will be crowded out 
by indiviGXDOV·FRQFHUQVWRHVFDSHSXQLVKPHQWRUSHQDOL]DWLRQ)RXUWK&RKHQLV
concerned that Stalinist frogmarching involves WKH´PDQLSXODWLRQµ of persons, since 
LWLQYROYHV´DFRQWURORYHU\RXUEHKDYLRXU that exercises a knowledge of the 
intimacies of your personality, what pleases you, what bores you, and so forthµKH
JORVVHVWKLVODVWFRQVLGHUDWLRQDVWKH´invasion of the inner ecoQRP\µ objection.40  
These problems will of course always obtain in the real world, taking people 
and policies as they are. Still, the first two of these considerations notably step 
RXWVLGHWKHLGHDOL]HGDVVXPSWLRQVZKLFKFKDUDFWHUL]HPXFKRI&RKHQ·VGLVFXVVLRQ
when, like Rawls, he assumes ideal levels of moral conscientiousness and 
commitment. That suggests that Cohen is being forced to occupy what is, for him, 
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non-ideal territory in order to generate critical material to throw at the Stalinist 
Worry. And that seems suspicious. 
&RKHQ·VWKLUGFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVKLVPRVWLPSRUWDQWWKLV is the point that 
Stalinist occupational conscription will make it difficult for individuals to act from a 
sense of justice, rather than acting simply in order to escape official censure. This 
consideration carries the further strategic significance of offering an internal 
supplementation to the ethical solution to the First Version, so that the conditions 
on freedom which are required by the ethical solution, when fully enumerated, 
might be rendered consistent with the conditions on freedom required to deal with 
the Stalinist Worry. But the claim that Stalinist occupational conscription will 
make it difficult for individuals to act from a sense of justice actually seems false. If 
Sarah willingly conforms to the law to work as a doctor, then we can still appeal to 
the value served by Sarah·VPRUDOLQVSLUDWLRQ Even if a Stalinist regime would 
prevent Sarah from not working as a doctor for £20,000 by heavily penalizing her 
failure not to work as a doctor for that salary, Sarah is not thereby precluded from 
acting on moral inspiration. This is because the explanation of why Sarah chooses 
to doctor, if and when she does choose to doctor, need not be that she is unable to 
refrain, without penalty, from doctoring. Sarah can still conform, out of moral 
inspiration, to the law which obliges her to work as a doctor.41 She can still be 
morally committed to the course of action which the law compels her to perform, 
even when declining that course of action is not available to her. This case has the 
approximate structure of a Frankfurt case.42 It may be over-determined that Sarah 
will doctor for £20,000, since, if inspiration fails her, she will be coerced into doing 
so anyway. But the fact that a Stalinist system will not permit Sarah to do anything 
except to doctor for £20,000 does not rob of her of the ability to make that choice 
out of moral conviction. Compare anti-homicide laws: I can be morally committed 
to not performing acts of homicide even if, were I to do so, I would reliably be 
caught and convicted. Despite the fact that I would be severely punished for these 
offences, I can still refrain from committing them for the right reasons, rather than 
for purely self-interested reasons. I can refrain from murdering other people 
because I think it is wrong to do so, not just because I want to avoid a lengthy 
prison sentence. 
Reservations must also attach WR&RKHQ·VFRQWHQWLRQWKDW6WDOLQLVW
frogmarching involves the invasion of the inner economy, or the objectionable 
manipulation of people. The main problem here is that Cohen has already provided 
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room for the first-person preURJDWLYHZKLFKLVPHDQWWRXSKROGHDFKSHUVRQ·VVHQVH
of herself as ´something other than an engine for the welfare of other peopleµ43 It is 
unclear what additional substantial critical opposition Cohen can muster against a 
looser form of Stalinist conscription that respected this bounded prerogative.44 
7DNHQWRJHWKHU&RKHQ·VFROOHFWHGRIIHULngs against the Stalinist Worry 
suggest the presence of commitments which outrun his possession of the 
arguments which are needed to properly ground those commitments. 
 
IV.  How to Back into Stalinism (Without Really Trying) 
Cohen is not, of course, precluded from enrolling other possible moral 
considerations into his opposition to the range of powers assumed by a Stalinist 
regime. After all, history books are awash with details of the crimes committed by 
6WDOLQ·VUHJLPHDVZHOODVRWKHUWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\UHJLPHVWKDWDSSUR[LPDWHGWRLW
in its cruelty and severity. The concern to avoid show trials, a sclerotic economy, 
and the general obliteration of private and family life that have been encouraged by 
overweening Stalinist-type states will surely be enough to confirm the lack of 
wisdom in tolerating a state that removed freedom of occupational choice. So 
Cohen may say; and who would disagree with him?  
TKRXJK&RKHQ·VDQWL-Stalinism, as a concrete political commitment, is of 
course to be applauded,45 this line of argument is incomplete, for our typical 
hostility to the prospect of occupational forcing seems clearly distinct from our 
objections to these other atrocities. Many of us would regard occupational 
conscription as objectionable in its own right, and not just as an indirect source of 
evidence that the state had assumed powers that were suddenly pointing in the 
direction of more gross and obvious moral outrages.46 
Interestingly, Cohen also concedes that, in the right circumstances, he 
would actually endorse legislation regarding job allocation, albeit non-coercive 
legislation. He writes, about the (doubtlessly XQDWWDLQDEOH´WUXO\MXVWVRFLHW\µ 
which consisted only of conscientious egalitarians: 
 
,QIRUPDWLRQDOSUREOHPVZRXOGSUHYHQWWKH>LGHDO@VWDWHIURP«
(noncoercively) legislating job allocation. But if it could do so, under a 
properly prerogative-informed egalitarian principle, then I would see nothing 
wrong with that.47 
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This turns out to be a costly concession, for the worry which now arises is 
that the reference to non-coercive legislation appears to be a merely contingent and 
ad hoc SLHFHRINLQGQHVVRQ&RKHQ·VSDUW,IWKHVWDWHLQDWUXO\MXVWVRFLHW\ZHUH
morally justified in legislating job allocation, then what exactly could prevent it 
from going one step further and coercively enforcing that legislation? None of these 
conscientious individuals, after all, would feel a strain, at least at that point. 
Legislative enforcement would merely be rubber-stamping what they were already 
inclined to do. If there is a decisive case for legislation, then there must be a 
presumptively compelling case for the coercive enforcement of that legislation. The 
laws would be enforceable, even if no enforcement was actually needed. 
But what if enforcement was needed? Could the enforceability of the 
legislation then be withdrawn? This would be a strange argument to adopt for 
someone who had already conceded that the legislation was enforceable. If and 
when enforcement did actually come to be needed, due perhaps to evidence of 
backsliding or unjust patterns of behaviour among the individuals governed by the 
legislation, the fact that such enforcement was applied to laws that had already 
been deemed to be legitimately enforceable would then seem to be a sufficient 
justification for their actual enforcement. The decision not to enforce them would 
seem perverse. We should not resist the enforcement of enforceable laws just 
because, out of the blue, some individuals might decide that they do not want to 
conform to them any more. These are, by assumption, enforceable laws which 
reflect the demands of justice. How could their enforcement³and in fact their very 
enforceability³be suspended just because individuals no longer fancied acting as 
justice requires them to act? 
This argumentative thread has taken us, in a small number of secure steps, 
all the way from occupational freedom to Stalinist conscription. &RKHQ·VDUJXPHQW
appears to have unravelled. In the Cohenian society, I think it remains unclear 
what the principled reasons for resisting these final steps would be. 
 
An earlier version of this article was first presented at the International Conference in 
Applied Philosophy, Carlsberg Institute, Copenhagen, in August 2013. Thanks to 
everyone there for very useful comments; I am especially grateful to Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, both for the initial invitation and for subsequent discussion. A lightly 
revised version was presented in Leeds, where once again it received very helpful 
comments. Additional thanks go to Andrew McGonigal for further revealing 
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discussion. Finally, I thank an anonymous reviewer for many helpful comments on 
what turned out to be the penultimate version. 
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